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abstract
Throughout his career Adam Ferguson made a series of conservative political 
pronouncements on contemporary events. This paper treats these pronouncements as 
having a solid basis in his social theory and examines his place in the conceptual devel-
opment of the tradition of British conservatism. It examines Ferguson’s distinction 
between two forms of human knowledge: book learning of abstract science acquired 
from formal education and capacity acquired from practical experience in real affairs. 
Ferguson’s empiricism leads to a series of sustained warnings against the danger of 
excessive abstraction to the pursuit of science and these concerns are extended into the 
social and political realm as he cautions against reliance on abstract philosophy and 
defends the superiority of practical politicians.
“We become students and admirers, instead of rivals; and substitute the knowl-
edge of books, instead of the inquisitive or animated spirit in which they were 
written.”
—Adam Ferguson, An Essay on the History of Civil Society (Essay: 206)
Much of the previous critical literature on the social and political thought of Adam 
Ferguson has considered his place, respectively, in the traditions of stoicism, civic 
republicanism and in the historical development of sociology.1 The present paper 
represents an attempt to add depth to the critical appreciation of Ferguson’s writings 
by examining his place in the conceptual development of the tradition of British 
conservatism. As a result, it treats Ferguson’s conservative political pronounce-
ments as having a solid basis in his social theory.2 In particular it will concern 
itself with the tradition of conservatism, developed by Burke and perfected by 
Oakeshott, that stresses a distinction between different forms of human knowledge 
and the vital role of unarticulated ‘practical’ knowledge in human action. Students 
of the history of political thought are well familiar with the conservative doubts 
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about excessive rationalism and academic experts that are expressed in the writ-
ings of Edmund Burke. As a man of action and a professional politician, Burke 
made the case that politics is best left to those with experience in matters of state, 
and cautioned against reliance on the abstracted principles of political philoso-
phers (Burke 1987: 35, 162). In what follows it will be demonstrated that Ferguson 
shared this scepticism about the value of speculation and makes a contribution 
to the development of conservative thought through his abiding concern about 
the potential ‘danger’ of book learning. In order to appreciate this conservative 
element in Ferguson’s work we must examine the central role played by epistemo-
logical concerns in his social theorizing.
knowledge and human nature
We should begin by noting that Ferguson does not disdain the theme of Enlight-
enment nor does he dismiss learning and a concern for the social function of 
knowledge from his work. Ferguson was by no means an unthinking conservative 
who distrusted innovation and philosophy. On the contrary, he placed the human 
pursuit of knowledge at the heart of his analysis of society. He believed that the 
exertion of mind in society was the “principal calling and occupation” of man’s 
nature (Essay: 33). Man is by nature an “artist” (Principles 1: 200) “destined” 
(Principles 1: 177) to act on the world around him and to improve his under-
standing from experience. The pursuit of knowledge as the key to understanding 
human psychology and its gradual advancement is, for Ferguson, a key factor in 
the development of social institutions and practices. Knowledge, he argues, is 
important in “every department of civil society” (Essay: 168) and history stands 
as an “accession of knowledge” (Essay: 33) to those who succeed, one that facili-
tates a gradual improvement in human society.3 Indeed he placed this theme at the 
centre of his understanding of the aim of society, which he described as “knowl-
edge, order, and wealth” (Essay: 175).
Ferguson argued that the human mind was “desirous of information” (Prin-
ciples 1: 271) and that, rather than being controlled by instinct, humans were 
destined to act from “observation and experience” (Institutes: 118). In going about 
our active lives our minds operate by drawing generalizations from past experi-
ence. The human mind acts as a system of classifi cation that draws on experi-
ence to order human thought. We assign phenomena to mental classifi cations of 
“species or class” (Institutes: 88-9) in a manner that introduces order into our 
perception of the world. At this point Ferguson is referring to the psychological 
functioning of the human mind. He argues that all thought is classifi cation and that 
all human minds operate in this manner. Differences between individuals arise, 
not from the operation of the mind, but rather from the acquired classifi catory 
structures produced by experience and socialization that give form to our thoughts. 
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As a result of this psychological theory Ferguson adopts a distinct approach to the 
understanding of science. “Abstract science” represents a conscious attempt to 
“systematize our own thoughts” (Principles 2: 70). It is a conscious, formalized 
rendering of the mode of operation of the human mind. The process of generaliza-
tion and classifi cation from observation and experience that typifi es the operation 
of the human mind is undertaken in a deliberate manner in an attempt to enlarge 
the understanding of the world around us.
In methodological terms Ferguson was a committed empiricist. This leads him, 
in the Institutes, to distinguish two forms of human knowledge that emerge as the 
human mind develops the deliberate pursuit of science: The fi rst type of know-
ledge is knowledge of facts, and the second is knowledge of rules. Knowledge 
of facts is the knowledge drawn from experience and observation of phenomena, 
while knowledge of rules is knowledge of the mental classifi cations that our minds 
have generalized from this factual knowledge. This leads Ferguson to follow the 
conventional approach and identify two forms of method in science: “Analytic” 
which proceeds from the observation of fact to establish general rules, and 
“Synthetic” where we proceed from general rules to their particular application 
(Institutes: 3).
It is at this point that we begin to see an important distinction emerge in Fergu-
son’s analysis of the practice and function of science. He is keen to stress that 
though the human mind and science operate through both knowledge of facts 
and rules, human practice places a pre-eminent focus on facts. For Ferguson, 
knowledge of fact is prior to knowledge of rules. It therefore becomes the “fi rst 
requisite” in the “conduct of affairs” (Institutes: 1). As he puts it: “Practice, or 
conduct of any sort, though regulated by general rules, has a continual reference 
to particulars” (Institutes: 2). Thus speculation is the establishment of general 
rules, while practice is the study of particular cases or the application of general 
rules to actual conduct. This distinction is further underlined when he refers to the 
distinction between history and science. History is a “collection” or narrative of 
facts, while “science” is a theory about the relation of those facts laid down in the 
form of generalizations from experience (Institutes: 2-4).4
Ferguson seems here to be making a point that is common to all of his Scot-
tish contemporaries. He argues that the practice of science must be conducted 
strictly in line with empirical evidence. Although science is by its nature theoret-
ical and composed of classifi cations and generalizations, these abstractions must 
be drawn from and strictly related to factual, experimental evidence if science 
is to be conducted in a rigorous manner. Ferguson notes that as scientifi c know-
ledge advances, the level of abstraction necessarily becomes more complex and, 
as a result, scientifi c discourse is rendered incomprehensible to most laypeople. 
The “language” of science becomes “abstruse and intricate” to the “vulgar” or 
uninitiated (Principles 1: 112). Such abstraction is still fundamentally based on 
the same model of the operation of mind that constitutes the thought processes of 
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all humans, but the level of discourse becomes accessible only to those experts 
who have devoted themselves to the pursuit of inquiry. According to Ferguson this 
opens science up to a series of dangers that may ultimately undercut the empirical 
foundations on which it is based. The fi rst such danger is the obvious one of over-
theorizing, of stretching generalizations beyond what the evidence warrants. In 
our desire to expand our knowledge we may become addicted to the process of 
abstraction and extend it beyond the empirical evidence. Thus Ferguson argues 
that we become the “dupes” of our own “abstractions” (Institutes: 65) and face 
the danger of confusing our abstractions for “matters of fact” (Principles 2: 264).5 
It is precisely this error that Ferguson attributes to social contract theorists who, 
in his view, shape their understanding of the nature of society to meet abstracted 
principles. As he puts it:
[T]he desire of laying the foundation of a favourite system, or a fond expecta-
tion … have on this subject, led to many fruitless inquiries, and given rise to 
many wild suppositions. Among the various qualities which mankind possess, 
we select one or a few particulars on which to establish a theory, and in framing 
our account of what man was in some imaginary state of nature, we overlook 
what he has always appeared within the reach of our own observation, and in 
the records of history (Essay: 8).
Moreover, excessive attachment to abstraction has very dangerous practical conse-
quences. Ferguson observes that: “Too much abstraction tends to disqualify men 
for affairs” (Institutes: 65). What he means by this is that the practical exercise of 
human social activity takes place in complex situations where a variety of circum-
stances interact. However, the tendency of abstract thinking is to separate out classi-
fi cations and generalizations, rather than to view the entirety of the situation as an 
interdependent whole. Like Adam Smith, Ferguson worries that the development 
of theoretical investigations that apply his Synthetic method can lead philosophers 
to adopt “systems” (Essay: 21) to which they then become adherents.6 Devotion 
to these abstracted systems leads the speculative thinker to apply its principles to 
all facets of experience, producing a desire to crowbar “the diversities of life” into 
“single points of view” (Principles 1: 289). As a result there is a danger that, as 
we pursue science, we can become wrapped up in our own abstractions. Excessive 
theorizing is a danger both to science itself and to the capacity of people to act in 
practical affairs. He argues: “Far fetched knowledge is not the most useful, either 
in the formation of theories, or in the conduct of life” (Principles 2: 458).7
One practical example that Ferguson provides of this danger is the error of 
excessive concern with the technical terminology of arguments. His example here 
is drawn from moral philosophy where he notes that we are in constant danger 
of mistaking for new discoveries what are in reality only defi nitional shifts made 
within the abstract arguments of philosophers: as a result we become the “Dupes 
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of Language” (Manuscripts: 243). The technical language of moral philosophy 
can become dangerously obfuscating when applied to actual human behaviour. 
Thus a speculative analysis may, through abstraction, reduce all acts of benevo-
lence to acts of selfi shness, but the value of this observation holds little reference 
to the actual motivations and behaviours of social actors. It represents a “mere 
innovation in language” rather than a “discovery of science” (Essay: 19). The 
target of this particular barb appears to be Mandeville, but the broader point belies 
an apprehension on Ferguson’s part about the danger of philosophy moving too far 
away from everyday life and the evidence upon which just reasoning about social 
issues must be founded.
It would appear that Ferguson is making two related points. The fi rst is a 
methodological concern that the pursuit of science should draw conclusions from 
the evidence of experience and not allow itself to fl oat off into abstractions that 
provide coherent systems of argument, but which bear little relation to reality. His 
second point appears to be a more general one about the relation of science to the 
practice of everyday life. The scientifi c method, with its abstractions and generali-
zations, is indeed a vital part of the successful unfolding of human potential in a 
social context, however the “capacity” (Essay: 32) for successful action in society 
is dependent on a different form of human behaviour and knowledge. If we are to 
understand the origins and functioning of civil society we cannot allow ourselves 
to be fooled by abstractions such as social contract theories or great legislator 
explanations. Ferguson’s famous attacks on these approaches in the Essay are 
linked to his demand for the strict provision of empirical evidence. But they are 
also an expression of his recognition that the pursuit of abstract thought can often 
lead us to delude ourselves into accepting the product of our theorizing as fact. 
We become the “dupes” of our own “subtilty” (Essay: 12) by placing excessive 
importance on the results of speculative thought.
The potentially disastrous consequences of this error are particularly apparent 
in moral philosophy. The danger is that the science of man, when it moves away 
from the evidence of experience and substitutes abstraction for practical capacity 
in political decision-making becomes little more than a set of “visionary schemes” 
(Principles 2: 84). What is required for successful social action is not “schemes 
of perfection” that are “far above the reach of mankind” (Principles 2: 401), but 
rather a capacity to act in affairs drawn from the evidence of moral science and 
the pursuit of active participation in social life. People “conceive perfection” but 
are capable only of “improvement” (Institutes: 162-3). The realization of human 
potential occurs, not when we attain some abstracted vision of perfection, but 
rather in the gradual attainment of improvements from human action. It is the 
struggle to improve rather than the attainment of an ideal that marks the progress 
of humankind. This is signifi cant for Ferguson because it implies that the know-
ledge required for success in practice is just as important to humanity as the attain-
ment of abstract or idealized knowledge. Moral philosophy becomes irrelevant 
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as a guide to practical affairs when it becomes excessively abstract. The result 
is that the political actors who substitutes abstraction for capacity are a danger 
to the stability of their nation. One who “has gone forth in search of speculative 
melioration, or improvement, not absolutely required to the safety of his country, 
is to be dreaded as a most dangerous enemy to the peace of mankind” (Principles 
2: 498-9).
the danger of books?
Ferguson believed that the growth of human civilization is a gradual train of 
“successive improvements” (Essay: 174) acquired by succeeding generations of 
individuals. More signifi cantly he asserts that such improvements are made
without any sense of their general effect; and they bring human affairs to a state 
of complication, which the greatest reach of capacity with which human nature 
was ever adorned, could not have projected; nor even when the whole is carried 
into execution, can it be comprehended in its full extent (Essay: 174).
The various arts have their several progressions and the results of these interact to 
transform the shape of human knowledge and society. The signifi cance of this is 
that the process of social change is accurately to be understood as the unfolding of 
the unintended consequences of human action. As Ferguson famously put it:
Every step and every movement of the multitude, even in what are termed 
enlightened ages, are made with equal blindness to the future; and nations 
stumble upon establishments, which are indeed the result of human action, but 
not the execution of any human design (Essay: 119).
In the terms of our earlier discussion, social change arises from the practical exer-
cise of capacity and not from the designs of speculation.
Moreover, it is the individuals who apply themselves to practical matters who 
bring about the gradual improvement of the various arts of human life. Inven-
tions and improvements are suggested from the experience of individuals familiar 
with their occupations. Where this becomes of particular interest for our present 
purposes is when we realize that this knowledge is not necessarily of the same 
form as that presented in the form of science and recorded in books.8 Ferguson had 
already acknowledged the existence of what Michael Polanyi (1958) would later 
call “tacit knowledge” in the stress he places on the centrality of habit to human 
action. In his discussion of language he stresses the fact that the parts of speech 
used with ease by the “vulgar” (Principles 1: 43) can only be identifi ed through 
much study and effort on the part of grammarians. There exists a form of human 
knowledge that is not attained from the deliberate pursuit of science or learning. 
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However, as the method of science is but a deliberate pursuit of the same opera-
tional principles as the human mind, Ferguson is able to conceptualize a form of 
unarticulated human knowledge acquired from action. Such knowledge is drawn 
from experience and held in a non-deliberative manner.
Ferguson neatly captures the notion of different forms of knowledge in the 
following passage from the Principles:
Accessions of power in us are sometimes termed skill, and consist in the know-
ledge of means that may be employed for the attainment of our end: they are 
also termed a sleight or facility of performance; and are acquired by mere prac-
tice, without any increase of knowledge. The fi rst is the result of science; the 
second is the result of habit. And there are few arts or performances of moment, 
in which it is not requisite that both should be united (Principles 1: 227-8).9
It is the thrust of Ferguson’s argument that one of the unintended consequences 
of active engagement by humans is that their “faculties” are sharpened from 
“use” (Principles 1: 201). If human invention is deployed to its greatest extent 
in dealing with practical challenges, if it fi nds a focus and application in dealing 
with the facts of a particular situation, then the accession of knowledge gained by 
individuals in the pursuit of their everyday endeavours is vital to the cumulative 
growth of human knowledge and the success of human action. As Ferguson puts 
it, the “active” life provides more challenges than are met with in “study however 
abstruse” (Principles 1: 267). It is here that we begin fully to realize the danger 
to which Ferguson is alluding. When science and learning begin to be recorded 
in books, when education in the teaching of knowledge acquired by others is 
believed to be the hallmark of human achievement, there is a real danger that we 
will turn away from the accessions of knowledge to be gained from an active life 
of practical engagement. In so doing regard for the knowledge of the records of 
speculation will overwhelm the attainment of capacity from practice.
Ferguson is clear that
[a]fter libraries are furnished, and every path of ingenuity is occupied, we are, 
in proportion to our admiration of what is already done, prepossessed against 
further attempts. We become students and admirers, instead of rivals; and 
substitute the knowledge of books, instead of the inquisitive or animated spirit 
in which they were written (ECS: 206).10
The danger is that as learning accumulates we spend more time acquiring know-
ledge from books than in applying ourselves to invention. This, according to 
Ferguson, means that we are inferior to those who wrote the books: he argues that 
“the object of mere learning is attained with moderate or inferior talents” (Essay: 
206). Thus where we content ourselves with learning what others taught it is prob-
able “that even our knowledge will be less than that of our masters” (Essay: 206). 
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In the Principles he returns to the same point and argues that the true indication 
of the vigour and health of a society is not the high achievements it has attained 
in the past so much as it is the spirit of application and invention that is to be 
seen in its people in the present. A civilization may have attained an impressive 
degree of scientifi c sophistication, but if it rests on its laurels, if it contents itself 
with acquiring knowledge from books rather than from active engagement, then 
it opens the door to a slow decline. Ferguson’s point is that a society that lacks 
accumulated knowledge in the arts and sciences, yet whose people are possessed 
of the active and ambitious character from which accessions of capacity actually 
arise, is the arena that “carries forward the mind” (Principles 1: 297). Humans 
“profi t by the task which they themselves perform, more than by mere informa-
tion, or instructions received from abroad” (Principles 1: 298). Thus a learned and 
civilized society may also be a stagnant society, and this stagnation may be the fi rst 
step towards a declining society. The progress of knowledge can be seen in every 
condition of an active society. As Ferguson would have it:
The source of improvement is open to man from the fi rst and the rudest efforts 
of his own ingenuity; and is shut only in the last, when he ceases to act for 
himself, or begins to acquiesce in the enjoyment of what is supplied to him by 
the ingenuity of others (Principles 1: 298).
the school of life
It would appear that Ferguson is distinguishing between two forms of knowledge: 
knowledge gained from education, or book learning, and knowledge secured from 
active exertion, which he terms “capacity” (Essay: 32). It is capacity, knowledge 
gained through active exertion and applied in practical affairs, that is the chief 
medium of human improvement and the characteristic of a fl ourishing civiliza-
tion. Human improvement comes not from the study of books, but from active 
engagement in life. Ferguson, in Stoic mode, argues that “the activity of life” is 
“the school of wisdom and virtue” (Principles 1: 178). And this idea of society as 
a school is returned to again and again in his writings.11
For Ferguson this knowledge is infi nitely preferable to that acquired from study 
and book learning. He notes:
Society itself is the school, and its lessons are delivered in the practice of real 
affairs. An author writes from observations he has made on his subject, not 
from the suggestion of books; and every production carries the mark of his 
character as a man, not of his mere profi ciency as a student or scholar (Essay: 
169).
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The best writers are those who draw on their own active exertions in society rather 
than dwell on the interpretation of what was written in the past. Society is the 
school from which we acquire our individual sums of knowledge, but it is also the 
best school for letters. Writing and study may indeed become a distinct “trade” 
(Essay: 171) but they are best performed by those engaged in an active life.12
The target of Ferguson’s ire here is scholasticism or “monastic retirement” 
(Essay: 171) more generally. Indeed, as Lehmann (1930: 93) notes, the attack 
extends to the “intellectualism” of his fellow Enlightenment thinkers.13 He argues 
that knowledge in general, and science in particular, declined during the scholastic 
era as the pursuit of knowledge moved away from active exertion in society and 
replaced capacity with the knowledge of books and doctrine. The “jargon of tech-
nical language” and the “impertinence of academical forms” (Essay: 171) created 
a moribund system that slowed the improvement of knowledge. The attainments 
of people came to be identifi ed with “the mere attainments of speculation” (Essay: 
171). Instead of studying and participating in the world around them, philosophers 
became obsessed with literary study. While much may be gained from a familiarity 
with the knowledge accrued by past civilizations, we cannot allow this admiration 
to ossify our own pursuit of knowledge from active exertion in the scene in which 
we fi nd ourselves. Ferguson writes:
Men are to be estimated, not from what they know, but from what they are able 
to perform; from their skill in adapting materials to the several purposes of life; 
from their vigour and conduct in pursuing the objects of policy, and in fi nding 
the expedients of war and national defence (Essay: 33).
It is from the contentions and ‘bustle’ (Essay: 33) of an active life that we are to 
draw true inspiration and to secure “useful knowledge” from the “living impres-
sions of an active life” (Essay: 34). The best place in which to learn or acquire 
capacity is an active scene where human ability and ingenuity are tried and invoked 
by the circumstances in which we fi nd ourselves. The best sailors, as Ferguson 
notes, are those who have experienced “boisterous” seas (Principles 1: 177).
Ferguson is not here suggesting that we abandon all study of past human 
achievements; rather “the examples and the experience of former and better times” 
(Essay: 171) should be used as a touchstone and source of inspiration for our own 
active innovation. For Ferguson the past is great not for its own sake but for the 
“accession of knowledge” (Essay: 33) it bestows on successive generations. The 
examples of the past are precisely that: examples, and not absolute and eternal 
standards to be preserved at all costs. Yet Ferguson was also well aware of the 
human tendency to intellectual snobbery. The educated often look down on the 
knowledge and capacity of men of practice. He sneeringly refers to the “pedantry 
and scholastic pride” (Essay: 77) that students of the classics often express when 
they see as a badge of vanity their knowledge of the songs of everyday folk from a 
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dead civilization while viewing as vulgar the everyday folk of their own civiliza-
tion precisely because they lack such book learning. For Ferguson active attempts 
in the arts are to be preferred to secure attainments. Knowledge and literature 
drawn from other civilizations are worth nothing unless they are absorbed by 
an active and engaged civilization. He lauds the Greeks because their cultural 
achievements were the result of an “active life” (Essay: 33) rather than a process 
of learning from others. It was this active life that Ferguson believed bred a blos-
soming civilization.
If our intellectual powers “draw” their “fi rst breath” from society (Principles 1: 
268) and build to a form of capacity that cannot be attained from mere study, then 
we are presented with a distinct relationship between forms of human knowledge. 
One example of this is Ferguson’s analysis of language. He argues that language is 
alive, that it is in a constant process of alteration and improvement from use. When 
we record language in books we “arrest” (Principles 1: 45) the fl eeting nature of 
its gradual evolution. As a result, though books act to preserve and communi-
cate knowledge they also, to a certain degree, freeze the living organism that is 
language. Where this becomes interesting is in the study of literature. Some great 
texts, his examples are Shakespeare and Milton, secure particular linguistic forms 
from change. The popularity of these authors, and our admiration for certain of 
their turns of phrase ossify the forms of linguistic expression. This in itself is not 
a problem so long as the active use and evolution of the language continues in 
everyday life, but should admiration for and education in the classics replace use 
as the chief medium for the communication of language, then the seeds of decline 
are sown.
A similar theme can be seen in Ferguson’s references to his own pedagogical 
methods.14 He begins the Principles with a preface that explains that the book is 
a written record that complements the teaching of his course and the headings 
previously published for student use (Principles 1: v). Ferguson points out that 
he lectured from headings and quite deliberately did not record his lectures in a 
written form. His reasoning behind this was that by lecturing from headings he 
provided his students with a fi rsthand experience of active thought. The delivery 
of lectures became a process of thinking through the headings that invited the 
students to follow the active train of his thought in a manner that engaged them 
with living knowledge. The arguments were thus presented as active thought proc-
esses rather than the more formalized rendering in the written version. It is clear 
that Ferguson viewed this educational technique as an attempt to re-create the 
active learning that functions in the acquisition of capacity from practical applica-
tion. His aim was to educate individuals in such a way as to form their character 
for active life. As he puts it elsewhere:
The parade of words, and general reasonings, which sometimes carry an appear-
ance of so much learning and knowledge, are of little avail in the conduct of 
life. The talents from which they proceed, terminate in mere ostentation, and 
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are seldom connected with the superior discernment which the active apply in 
times of perplexity (Essay: 31-2).
If this is true, as Ferguson clearly believed it is, then our estimation of people must 
be based, as we noted before, not on what they know, but on what they are able to 
perform. The contents of their minds are revealed in their capacity for action and 
not in their ability to acquire and communicate academic forms. This is brought 
into clearer relief when Ferguson distinguishes between “Men of speculation” and 
“Men of ability”:
Men of speculation also are apt to mistake their own abstraction for realities; 
and should fi nd their talents misplaced in the midst of affairs that have reference 
to circumstances indefi nitely varied and minute. Their merit lies in discourse 
rather than action; and they may appear with advantage, where general knowl-
edge is to be displayed in language, without the trial of practice and applica-
tion to the production of real effects. Men of ability in conduct are often defi -
cient in discourse; and the eloquent, on the contrary, often descend from their 
eminence, when brought to the test of ability in any of the more diffi cult scenes 
of action (Principles 1: 136).
Success in affairs is based on capacity and not on book learning. In “affairs”, 
Ferguson notes, there is nothing “abstract, or free from its particularities” (Prin-
ciples 1: 106). He distinguishes the two types of thought by referring to them as 
“abstraction” and “imagination” (Principles 1: 106-7). Abstract thinkers produce 
generalizations and apply abstract Synthetic principles to real life situations. As a 
result, according to Ferguson, they are aware only of those facets of situations that 
are relevant to their theoretical models. They have only a partial view of the scene 
before them. On the other hand, the man of capacity applies “imagination”, and 
considers all of the aspects of the situation before deciding on a course of action 
(Principles 1: 106-7). By refraining from abstract thought and drawing on prac-
tical knowledge people of capacity have a truer picture of the scene before them 
and, as a result, are better suited to make successful decisions in practical affairs. 
So Ferguson, like Burke, believed that people of action are to be preferred to 
people of speculation in the conduct of affairs because the knowledge they possess 
and their mode of approaching decisions are more likely to produce successful 
results than those of speculative thinkers raised on theories and books.15 This is 
not to say that philosophy has no place in public life, rather it is to note that people 
educated in philosophical principles should confi ne themselves to acting in a prac-
tical manner in the circumstances in which they fi nd themselves.16
We can even see this line of argument in Ferguson’s famous doubts about the 
social consequences of the division of labour. He was well aware that part of the 
advantage of the division of labour is that it focussed individual attention and 
produced specialists who had greater knowledge in their particular fi elds than that 
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attained by generalists. Indeed Ferguson does not refer to the division of labour, 
instead preferring the phrase “separation of arts and professions” (Essay: 172) 
to indicate the signifi cance of the application of attention to different subjects. 
However, one of his greatest fears is that the intellectual faculties of most of human-
kind will be constricted by the extension of the division of labour. His eloquent 
description of the mentally stunted labourer in an industrial society is contrasted 
to the “savage” whose capacities are broader than his more “civilized” counterpart 
(Essay: 88, 173-5; Manuscripts: 145). The savage is a person of capacity who acts 
in a broad variety of situations to secure his survival, while the modern labourer 
has her attention restricted to some one simple action such that she becomes inca-
pable of acting with capacity in other fi elds of endeavour. The knowledge of the 
specialist is bought at the expense of limiting attention to the task at hand. In the 
case of many labourers the skill acquired will be a simple physical operation that 
will require little application. As a result the capacity of the labourer to act, or 
even to understand, beyond her own narrow fi eld is radically reduced. Ferguson’s 
particular Republican concerns with the decline of politics and martial spirit are 
a manifestation of the fear that lack of practice will produce a decline in capacity 
among the whole of the population, leaving us bereft of individuals capable of 
acting successfully in defence of the nation in the practical scenes of life. If we 
give up our political and military roles to professionals, then we will see a gradual 
withering of the capacities necessary to undertake these functions in the popula-
tion at large. The result is the danger of both political despotism and invasion from 
abroad.
some qualifications
For all of Ferguson’s doubts about the potential dangers of book learning we 
should also be clear that he does not dismiss out of hand the value of abstract spec-
ulation or learning from books. He is clear that written knowledge in the form of 
books is vital for preserving and “communicating” (Principles 1: 296) knowledge 
of the past. Indeed in his own writings he makes constant reference to the authority 
of books written by others. Part of his project of constructing a conjectural history 
of civil society is based on the comparison of the evidence of historical records 
with those of travellers’ descriptions of newly encountered societies in other parts 
of the world. He is clear that books “retain the knowledge of what has ceased to 
be spoken for many ages past” (Principles 1: 47). If communication is an integral 
part of humankind’s natural sociability, then the communication of experience in 
the form of books is a vital linguistic expression of a key facet of human nature.
Ferguson’s doubts are not really about the value of books themselves, or indeed 
about the pursuit of abstract theorizing. Rather what concerns him is that reading 
books and abstract thought may come to crowd out participation and capacity. 
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We are left with knowledge in the form of “mere speculation” (Kettler 2005: 148) 
when we really need both this and the tacit knowledge gleaned from practice. 
The knowledge gleaned from an active life takes a different form from that learnt 
from books, and the two must complement each other in the successful pursuit of 
human action. One area where Ferguson displays his interest in the melding of the 
two forms of knowledge is in his discussion of education. We noted before that 
he believed the best mode of education is the sharing of active thought. By stimu-
lating the minds of his students to active exertion, he hoped to avoid the dangers 
of rote learning and an unthinking admiration for the work of past thinkers. He 
extends this view by arguing that the proper role of education is not really the 
dissemination of knowledge–—it is instead the formation of “character” (Essay: 
34). What he means by this is that it is not so much the content of books that 
students should absorb and take away from the classroom with them as it is the 
attitude of critical thought and a desire to pursue ‘good’ and ‘truth’ through active 
engagement.17 As part of his attack on scholasticism he attacked learning in retreat 
and the reliance on familiarization with canonical texts. His point was that one 
might be intimately familiar with the details of classical texts and abstract theories, 
and yet be incapable of acting a meaningful part in the scenes of everyday life. 
For example a scholar may be intimately familiar with the details of a historical 
battle, but be incapable of applying the lessons of this knowledge to the actual fi eld 
of battle. A well-shaped education provides students with the mental outlook and 
character that facilitates successful action in the real world.
It is also worth noting that Ferguson does not completely denigrate the role of 
the “retired” student (Principles 1: 281). Instead he notes that the knowledge of 
abstract science is of great use to society so long as it is disseminated and applied 
by people of practice and character. Thus the discoveries of scientists spread 
across the globe and are put to work in the active scene of life: “The suggestions 
of individuals pervade entire societies of men; spread over nations, and descend 
to subsequent ages however remote” (Principles 1: 281). As a result the recluse 
“investigating the laws of nature, which relate to the concerns of men, is no less 
employed for his country than the most active of its servants; or than those who are 
most occupied in discharging the functions of state” (Principles 1: 269). Abstract 
knowledge must be coupled with practical capacity if it is to be of use in the 
active sphere of human life. The danger lies, not in the pursuit of science, but in 
the failure to appreciate that science and academic learning are only one form of 
human knowledge. Application to practical affairs requires a different form of 
knowledge from that necessary to the retired pursuit of abstract science. Similarly 
if we substitute knowledge of the literary productions of the past for experience 
gained from participation in present affairs, then we risk losing the very spirit and 
character with which the records of past events are imbued.
If human institutions are indeed the result of human action, but not the product 
of human design, then this observation brings with it the awareness that the species 
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of knowledge that is of signifi cance in social change cannot solely be the result 
of retired speculation and abstract philosophy. The conclusion drawn from this by 
Ferguson is the same as that later drawn by Burke and Oakeshott: Social change 
is a gradual process, and political reform ought properly to be undertaken in a 
careful and conservative manner by those with practical experience gained from 
political participation.
conclusion
How signifi cant, then, are Ferguson’s conservative concerns about the danger of 
book learning? In terms of situating Ferguson’s thought in the broader history of 
ideas it seems clear that his conservative pronouncements on practical politics are 
supported by an important epistemological strand in his writings. This strand of 
thought has resonances with later epistemological writings by the likes of Polanyi 
and Oakeshott, who also believed that the signifi cance of practical knowledge 
had distinct political connotations. Moreover Ferguson’s conservatism intersects 
with the more commonly observed Stoic and Republican strands in his thought to 
provide a further justifi cation for his support of an active and engaged citizenry as 
essential for a healthy society. His fear of entrusting political decisions to abstract 
thinkers demonstrates what Kettler calls his “intellectual’s concern for practice” 
(Kettler 2005: 175), but more importantly it reveals an appreciation of the unar-
ticulated wisdom acquired from the practical experience of politics. This provides 
a link between his conservative epistemology, his preference for ‘realism’ in polit-
ical decision-making and his support for Republican participation.
From the qualifi cations that we observed it might be thought that Ferguson is 
guilty of back-pedalling slightly in attacking abstract scholars and then admitting 
the social utility of their discoveries. However his admission of the contribution 
made by retired students is qualifi ed by his desire that their discoveries should be 
disseminated through the work of a class of practical citizens able to combine the 
discoveries of science with an appreciation of the practicalities of the social world. 
Ferguson’s main concern is that these are distinct tasks that involve different forms 
of knowledge. The danger of books to this process is that we may become mere 
admirers of an intellectual canon drawn from the past, leaving us disposed against 
the active pursuit and application of virtue and knowledge in our own lives. The 
inevitable result of this, Ferguson feared, would be intellectual and moral stagna-
tion coupled with a potentially disastrous desire to apply abstract thought as a 
suitable criterion for practical decision-making.
The question as to whether Ferguson’s fears were warranted is another matter. 
This aspect of his thought clearly fi ts with Burke’s prescient concerns about the 
possible course of the French Revolution—of which Ferguson himself was a 
 sceptical opponent. It also fi ts comfortably with the commonplace idea that the 
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Scottish Enlightenment was a more cautious movement than its French counterpart 
when it came to using the claims of science and reason to urge political reform. 
At the same time Ferguson was clearly not advocating some sort of glorifi ed phil-
istinism or unthinking conservatism. Indeed intellectual intolerance and stubborn 
adherence to systems of thought are two of the possible dangers that he identifi es 
as arising from book learning. The well-worn image of the cloistered academic 
engaged in sterile intellectual discourse within a received canon has become a 
stereotype precisely because it has a degree of truth to it. Similarly, the belief that 
trained philosophers would make the best rulers is an idea at least as old as Plato, 
and it is easy to see how the two might naturally come together in the wake of the 
Enlightenment’s admiration for science and thirst for social reform.
If we consider that Friedrich Hayek and Michael Oakeshott would later develop 
the Burkean line of argument (albeit with idealist accretions in Oakeshott’s case) 
in response to the ‘rationalism’ of twentieth-century socialists and totalitarians, it 
may be that Ferguson stands vindicated as having identifi ed an abiding political 
problem. This problem is namely the potential danger that admiration for the 
abstract knowledge of science can lead to neglect of other forms of knowledge 
and ossify into dogmas that prevent, or indeed pervert, effective action in the arena 
of practical political decision-making. If Ferguson saw his position as having the 
twin roles of popularizing and applying abstract ideas in real world situations, 
and shaping the character of the next generation of decision-makers to ensure the 
disinterested pursuit of virtue, then we see his attitude to books as being that of 
a means to these higher ends. Book learning and abstract philosophers have their 
place, but for Ferguson, as for later conservatives, that place is nowhere near the 
real political process where capacity is a surer source of wisdom.
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notes
An earlier version of this paper benefi ted from being discussed at the Historical, Interna-
tional and Normative Theory Group (HINT) at the Department of Politics, University of 
Glasgow. Thanks are due to those present and to the Editor of this Journal for helpful advice 
in improving the paper.
 1 For examples of these views see respectively Merolle (2005), Pocock (1975) and MacRae 
(1969).
 2 W.H. Lehmann (1930: 145), in describing Ferguson’s political views, refers to him as a 
“philosophical conservative” whose outlook is that of a “political realist”. Similarly his 
biographer Jane Fagg (1995: xlvii, lxxxii) notes his generally conservative politics and 
opposition to the French and American Revolutions.
 3 Ferguson begins his History of Rome by noting that mankind may “profi t” from the study 
of history because to know the past is to “know mankind” (Rome: 10).
 4 Of course Ferguson himself goes on to blur this distinction by producing a form of theo-
retical history that attempts to plug gaps in the narrative of historical record by conjecture 
from other evidence.
 5 Here Ferguson follows the well-worn Enlightenment path of championing Newton 
over Descartes by arguing that the desire to plug gaps in our knowledge leads us to 
over-extend our arguments. He notes: “When we do not perceive a cause, we are apt 
to imagine one, and thus substitute imagination to supply the defect of our knowledge” 
(Principles 1: 117). See Lehmann (1930: 171) for a complete list of the errors to which 
Ferguson believed social science was open.
 6 For Smith on the danger of systems see (1984: 185; 1982: 47). Ferguson was well aware 
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that his apparent predilection for Stoicism left him open to precisely this charge and was 
quick to assert that he was “not conscious of having warped the truth to suit any system 
whatever” (Principles 1: 7).
 7 A point recognised by Kettler (2005: 108) who attributes it to Ferguson’s attempt to 
counter Hume’s arguments on epistemology.
 8 Both Michael Polanyi (1958) and Michael Oakeshott (1991) stress that successful human 
action depends largely on the application of both “express” and “tacit” knowledge, both 
“technical” and “practical” knowledge.
 9 Ferguson’s argument here is almost identical to that later made famous in Michael Oake-
shott’s description of practical and technical knowledge (1991: 12).
10 A point recognised by Lehmann who relates Ferguson’s rejection of “substituting books 
for life, libraries for social laboratories, literary orthodoxy for social experience, and 
generally the orthodoxy of books for social reality” (1930: 170).
11 See also (Principles 1: 269; Manuscripts: 283-87). The recurring image is noted by 
Lehmann (1930: 54).
12 This aspect of Ferguson’s thought leads Kettler (2005: 170, 175) to view him as “an 
intellectual” rather than a philosopher. His concern was with the practical use of knowl-
edge and its application in society rather than with cloistered academic debate between 
philosophers.
13 Lehmann also notes Ferguson’s attack on “the danger of closet philosophy, intellectual 
retirement, and a bookish, cloistered education” (1930: 166). Kettler adds that Ferguson 
was “frequently prepared to deprecate the value of knowledge not directly applicable to 
action and to deny the desirability of contemplation” (2005: 144).
14 For a discussion of Ferguson’s active pedagogy see Kettler (2005: 7) and Fagg (1995: 
xli).
15 Ferguson begins his pamphlet Refl ections Previous to the Establishment of a Militia with 
the assertion that men of speculation are rarely able to bring about reform. He argues: 
“Remarkable changes in Policy commonly arise from some urgent Occasion; and the 
projects of speculative Men meet with little attention, when not supported by a prevailing 
Sense of Necessity or Expedience” (Militia: 1).
16 Indeed Ferguson praises the active engagement of men of philosophical principle in the 
everyday life of the Roman Republic (Rome: 179, 343, 358-9). Men such as Cicero are 
praised, however, precisely because their action was imbued and not obsessed with the 
guidance of philosophical schools. They were men of action before they were men of 
speculation.
17 Richard Sher (1985, 1990) has discussed this aspect of eighteenth-century Scottish 
University education in some detail, attributing it in part to the wide admiration for the 
teaching style of Francis Hutcheson.
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